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I. INTRODUCTION

In August 2000, The Onion published a humorous article entitled
"Hershey's Ordered to Pay Obese Americans $135 Billion."! The
article was a parody of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement
between the states and the tobacco industry and accused "Big
Chocolate" of engaging in the same marketing practices as "Big
Tobacco."2 The Onion article, however, proved to be remarkably
prescient now that trial lawyers have begun to take aim at the food
industry. In June 2003, an organization known as the Public Health
Advocacy Institute hosted a conference in Boston to "encourage and
support litigation against the food industry."3 The conference was
attended by 120 trial lawyers, public health officials, and consumer
advocates. Speakers at the conference made it clear that these
groups would like to subject "Big Food" to the same treatment that
they meted out to "Big Tobacco" in the 1990s. 4
The first salvo in this campaign against "Big Food" was Barber
v. McDonald's Corp.,5 a lawsuit that was brought in July 2002,
against McDonald's, Burger King, Wendy's, and KFC, by Caesar
Barber, a middle-aged 272-pound man who alleged that the
defendants produced and sold foods that were fattening and
unhealthy. 6 Barber not only sought compensatory damages and
attorneys' fees, but also asked the court to require the defendants to
place nutrition labels on individual food items and to pay for
educational programs to teach children and adults about the health

1 THE ONION, Aug. 2, 2000 (available at http://www.theonion.com for a fee) (on file with
author).
2 Id.
a Abraham Genauer, Conference Highlights Assault on "Big Food", THE HILL, June 11,
2003, at 36, quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 108-432, at 5 (2004); Marguerite Higgins, Advocates Meet
to Plan Big Mac Attack on Fat; Legal Assault on Fast·food Industry Will Follow Blueprint
Used Against Tobacco Firms, WASH. TIMEs, June 22, 2003, at Al.
• See Genauer, supra note 3 (calling food lawsuits new "pop tort" of the month).
5 Complaint of Caesar Barber, Barber v. McDonald's Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (No.
23145/20002), available at http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslmcdonaldslbarbermcds72302
cmp.pdf(last visited Feb. 1, 2005}.
6 Jeremy H. Rogers, Note, Living on the Fat of the Land: How to Have Your Burger and
Sue It Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, 860 (2003).
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effects of consuming fast food. 7 However, Barber withdrew his
lawsuit several months later.8
Undaunted by this defeat, Barber's attorney, Samuel Hirsch,
soon filed another lawsuit against McDonald's. In this case, Pelman
v. McDonald's Corp., a class action, the plaintiffs alleged that eating
McDonald's fast food caused them to become obese.9
As with the tobacco litigation, trial lawyers expect to lose some
of their cases at this early stage in the litigation cycle, but they are
confident that they will eventually pressure the food industry into
a lucrative settlement. 10 According to John Banzhaf, law professor,
social reformer, and self-proclaimed "legal terrorist,"U "as was the
case with tobacco, it takes time for legal theories to coalesce in a
way that forces major societal change.,,12 Professor Richard
Daynard, head of Northeastern University's Tobacco Products
Liability Project agrees, declaring, "I think we'll see a progression
similar to what we saw with tobacco. "13 Thus, although unsuccessful in Barber and Pelman, trial lawyers are not discouraged and will
no doubt cook up more litigation in the near future.
That is not to say that lawyers and public health advocates have
not already had some impact on "Big Food." For example, McDonald's paid $12 million to settle a suit for allegedly failing to inform
consumers that it had cooked its french fries in beef fat.14 In
addition, the manufacturers of Big Daddy's Ice Cream and Pirate's
Booty, a snack food, paid $8 million for providing inaccurate
nutritional information on its product labeling. 15 The threat of
litigation has produced results in other cases as well. Thus, concerns
about future tort liability caused Kraft to remove trans-fatty acids

7

[d. at 871.

a [d.

237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Laura Parker, Legal Experts Predict New Rounds in Food Fight, USA TODAY, May 7,
2004, at 3A (stating that tobacco lawyers lost cases for decades before they won).
11 Libby Copeland, Snack Attack: After Taking on Big Tobacco, Social Reformer Jabs at
New Target: Big Fat, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2002, at Fl.
n
12 Blaine Harden, Eatery Joins Battle with "The Bulge : Obesity Lawsuits Spur Dessert
Protest, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2003, at A3.
13 Erin Duggan, Tobacco-suit Tactics Now Target Fast Food, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Apr.
6, 2003, at AI.
14 Parker, supra note 10, at 3A.
15 [d.
9

10
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from its Oreo cookies 16 and assisted John Banzhafin persuading the
Seattle School Board to reconsider its decision to allow its schools to
sell Coca-Cola products exclusively in their vending machines. 17
Professor Banzhaf and Michael Jacobson, Executive Director of the
Center for Science in the Public Interest, also sent letters to BaskinRobbins, Ben & Jerry's, Cold Stone Creamery, Haagen-Dazs
Shoppes, Inc., TCBY, and Friendly Ice Cream Corp., threatening
potential litigation if these ice cream makers did not add healthier
alternatives and place nutritional information on their menus. 1S
These efforts are beneficial to the extent that they induce the food
industry to produce healthier products or to provide consumers with
more information about nutrition and health. However, this Article
concludes that anti-obesity litigation is socially and economically
undesirable. While something should be done about obesity and
obesity-related health problems, lawsuits like Pelman are not the
answer.
Part II briefly discusses some of the arguments made in the
Pelman case. Part III examines a number of potential liability
theories and concludes that plaintiffs are not likely to prevail under
design defect, product category liability, or failure to warn theories.
Deceptive advertising claims, especially when based on broadly
written consumer protection statutes are more viable, as are
negligent marketing claims based on the targeting of young
children.
Part IV is concerned with potential limitations on liability.
Plaintiffs will find that causation requirements are particularly
difficult to overcome. Duty and proximate cause may also be
troublesome. In addition, defendants will try to characterize the
bad eating habits of obese consumers as product misuse. Suppliers
of raw materials and ingredients may be able to transfer liability to
the seller of the finished product by relying on the doctrine of
shifting responsibility. Furthermore, sellers of packaged foods, if
properly labeled, are likely to escape liability altogether by invoking
ld.
Deborah Bach, Coke Deal Could Make Schools Targets of Suits, SEATTLE POSTlNTELLIGENCER, July 2, 2003, at Al.
18 Marguerite Higgins, Lawyers Scream About Ice Cream, WASH. TIMES, July 25, 2003,
atAl.
16

17

844
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the concept of federal preemption. Restaurants and fast-food
vendors may also be able to raise federal preemption as a defense.
Finally, sellers offood products will seek to reduce their liability by
raising conduct-based defenses such as contributory negligence,
comparative fault, and assumption of risk.
The policy aspects of anti-obesity litigation are examined in Part
V. The first issue is whether public health policy should be
determined by means of litigation. This Article contends that
legislatures and administrative agencies are institutionally superior
to courts when it comes to formulating and implementing health
policy initiatives. Another issue is economic impact. Litigation
expenses and payment of large damage awards would impose
substantial economic costs on the food industry and those who are
associated with it. A third concern is that anti-obesity litigation
undermines the principle of autonomy and personal responsibility
and reinforces the culture of blame that is spreading throughout our
society.
Part VI considers what might be done to discourage further antiobesity litigation in the future. This Article advocates that courts
strictly adhere to existing tort doctrines and reject expansive and
novel liability theories. Further, this Article examines possible
legislative solutions, including several bills that are currently
pending in Congress.
II. PELMAN V. McDONALD'S CORP.

On August 22, 2002, the parents of two minor children filed a
class action suit in state court against the McDonald's Corporation,
McDonald's of New York, and two New York City fast-food restaurants. 19 The lawsuit was brought on behalf of all minors in the state
of New York who had purchased and consumed McDonald's
products ("Pelman,,).20 On September 30, 2002, the defendants
petitioned to remove the case to federal district court. 21 Shortly

19
20
21

Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512,519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
[d.
[d.
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thereafter, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.22 After
a hearing on January 22, 2003, the court dismissed all five counts
for lack of specificity but granted the plaintiffs leave to file an
amended complaint.2"
Count I of the plaintiffs' original complaint alleged that the
defendants had violated sections 349 and 350 of the New York
Consumer Protection From Deceptive Acts and Practices Act
("Consumer Protection Act"). 24 Section 349 of that Act prohibits
"[dieceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade
or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state,"25 while
section 350 bans "[flalse advertising in the conduct of any
business."" Although the plaintiffs did not identify any specific
acts, practices, or advertisements in their complaint, the court
discussed several statements by McDonald's that the plaintiffs had
later claimed were deceptive.27 The first was an advertising
campaign that used the phrases "McChicken Everyday" and "Big N'
Tasty Everyday." The second was a statement on McDonald's
website that "McDonald's can be part of any balanced diet and
lifestyle."" The court concluded that the exhortation to eat at
McDonald's "everyday" made no specific health claim and, therefore,
was "mere puffery."29 The court also refused to characterize as
deceptive a statement on McDonald's website that implied moderate
consumption of McDonald's products could be part of a healthy diet
and lifestyle.3 °
The plaintiffs also contended that McDonald's failure to post
nutritional information on its product packaging or at points of
purchase amounted to a deceptive practice. In the past, some New
York courts had held that a business might violate the state's

Id.
23 Id. at 543.
22

Id. at 524.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004).
26 Id. § 350.
27 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
24

25

28

id.

Id. at 528. Puffery is an exaggerated statement that makes no specific claims upon
which consumers might rely. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911
F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990).
30 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28.
2

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

846

[Vol. 39:839

consumer protection statute by failing to provide information to
consumers when "the business alone possesses material information
that is relevant to the consumer and fails to provide this information."3 ' In this case, however, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to allege that McDonald's alone possessed information
about the nutritional content of its products or that consumers could
not reasonably obtain this information.32 In fact, the plaintiffs
acknowledged that nutritional information was available at McDonald's website.3 3 Consequently, the court dismissed Count I of the
plaintiffs' complaint.3 4
Count II alleged that some of McDonald's deceptive advertising
was targeted at young children.3 5 Although the plaintiffs failed to
identify any specific example of such advertising in their complaint,
the court discussed two promotions that were clearly aimed at
minors. The first featured a plastic beef steak figure named
"Slugger" who was accompanied by a pamphlet on nutrition that
assured children that eating two servings a day from the meat group
would help them to "climb higher and ride [their] bikes farther."36
The court indicated that this statement might have been specific
enough to survive a motion to dismiss if it had been set forth in the
original complaint; however, the court warned that if the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint, they would have to show that the
statement was deceptive and that they suffered injury as a consequence.3 7 The second promotion involved "Mightier Kids Meal," a
super-sized version of the "Happy Meal."3 8 The plaintiffs maintained that the term "Mightier Kids Meal" led children to believe
that they would become "mightier" or more grown-up if they
consumed larger portions of McDonald's products.3 9 The court,

" Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741,
745 (N.Y. 1995).
32 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
3

Id. at 530.

3 Id.
35 Id.
36

Id.

37

id.

38

Id.
id.

39
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however, rejected this argument, concluding once again that
McDonald's claim was mere "puffery."4 °
Count III argued that McDonald's products were "inherently
dangerous" because they contained high levels of cholesterol, fat,
salt, and sugar. 41 Although the plaintiffs characterized this as a
negligence claim, the court looked to the strict liability scheme of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A for guidance. Relying
primarily on comment i, 42 the court concluded that food products
that were harmful only when consumed in excessive amounts were
not defective or unreasonably dangerous, particularly when the
of overconsumption were generally known by
health effects
43
consumers.
Count IV asserted that McDonald's had a duty to warn about the
potential health risks associated with consuming (or overconsuming)
its products and failed to do so.44 While conceding that this was
normally an issue for the jury to decide, the court concluded that the
health risks of eating too much fast food were open and obvious to
the general population.45 In addition, because the plaintiffs had not
established that McDonald's products significantly contributed to
their obesity and health problems, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to show any causal connection between the
their injuries. 46 For these reasons,
defendant's failure to warn and
47
the court dismissed Count IV.
Finally, in Count V, the plaintiffs charged that McDonald's
products contained ingredients that were addictive." The court
pointed out that the presence of addictive ingredients in McDonald's
products, in contrast to the risk of obesity, was not so "open and
obvious" that consumers could be expected to know about it. 49 Thus,
40 Id.
41

Id. at 531.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) ("Many products cannot be
made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk
of harm, if only from over-consumption.").
"' Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 531-33.
4
Id. at 540.
42

4
4

47
48
49

Id. at 541.
Id. at 541-42.

Id. at 542.
Id.
Id.
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if McDonald's products actually contained addictive ingredients, its
products might be unreasonably dangerous under the consumer
expectation test, and the defendant might have a duty to warn about
this characteristic."
The court dismissed Count V, however,
because the plaintiffs failed to identify any specific ingredient or
combination of ingredients in McDonald's products that could be
characterized as addictive. 5 ' The plaintiffs had also failed to explain
the general nature of their alleged addiction. 2
The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 19, 2003,
and McDonald's again filed a motion to dismiss.5 3 In an unreported
opinion ("Pelman IF), the district court granted this motion on
September 3, 2003, and refused to allow the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint any further.5 4 The amended complaint was much
narrower than the original complaint and contained three counts,
all of which were based on alleged violations of sections 349 and 350
of New York's Consumer Protection Act.55 Count I contended that
McDonald's advertising and publicity campaigns misled the
plaintiffs by claiming that its food products were nutritious and
could be safely consumed on a daily basis. Count II alleged that
McDonald's failed to disclose that processing and artificial ingredients made its products less healthy than represented in its advertising and publicity.
Finally, Count III declared that McDonald's
engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices by falsely stating
that it provided nutritional brochures and information in all of its
restaurants. 8
McDonald's contended that all of these claims should be dismissed because the applicable statute of limitations had run for

'o Id. (stating claim of addictive quality of fast food currently under investigation).
51 Id.
52 Id.
' Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02 Civ. 7821 (RWS), 2003 WL
22052778, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
5

Id. at *14.

Id. at *2. The plaintiffs also alleged that McDonald's negligently failed to warn
consumers about the health risks of eating the highly processed foods served at its
restaurants. Id. However, the plaintiffs abandoned this common-law claim before oral
arguments on the motion to dismiss. Id.
'

5 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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each of the alleged misrepresentations. 9 McDonald's also maintained that the plaintiffs had not alleged that they actually saw any
of the alleged misrepresentations."0 Furthermore, McDonald's
declared that plaintiffs had failed to assert that any of these alleged
misrepresentations caused any injury to them.6 ' Finally, McDonald's argued that the alleged misrepresentations were not deceptive,
but were, at most, "nonactionable puffery."62
The court agreed that claims by adult plaintiffs were barred by
the statute of limitations but concluded that the statute had been
tolled during the infancy of the minor plaintiffs and had not run
when the lawsuit was first brought. 3 The court also addressed
McDonald's claim that the plaintiffs had not seen any of the
statements or advertisements described in their amended complaint, concluding that reliance was necessary for a false advertising
claim under section 350 of the Consumer Protection Act, but not for
a deceptive practices claim under section 349.64 Consequently, the
court ruled that in order to proceed with their § 350 claim, the
plaintiffs must plead the substance of the advertisements upon
which they allegedly relied.6" In this case, since the plaintiffs
claimed that they would not have consumed so much of McDonald's
food had the company not misled them about the nutritional content
of its food, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had satisfied the
reliance requirement. 6
However, the court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to
show an adequate causal connection between the consumption of
McDonald's food and their alleged injuries.6 7 In particular, the court
observed that the plaintiffs failed to discuss the extent to which
other factors may have caused their health problems.6 Finally, the

59 Id. at
60 Id.

*4.

Id.
id.
6
Id. at *4-*6.
64 Id. at *7.
65 Id. at *8 (stating vague allegations of "long-term deceptive campaign" insufficient to
meet reliance requirement).
66 Id. at *9.
67 Id. at *11.
61
62

68Id.
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court concluded that plaintiffs had not shown that McDonald's
advertising was objectively misleading.69 The plaintiffs had asserted
that McDonald's claim that its french fries and hash brown potatoes
were cooked in 100% vegetable oil and were cholesterol-free was
misleading.7" However, the court concluded that McDonald's had
not made such a claim and that its statements regarding vegetable
oil and cholesterol were essentially accurate. 7 ' Consequently,
having determined that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that
McDonald's caused the plaintiffs' injuries or that McDonald's
representations to the public were deceptive, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint without leave to amend.72
The trial court's decision, however, was reversed on appeal.73 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the claims based
on § 350 of the New York General Business Law should have been
dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they had relied
on any particular advertisement or promotional material.74
However, the appeals court concluded that proof of actual reliance
was not required for claims based on § 349 of the Business Law
statute.75 Furthermore, the court determined that the limited notice
pleading standard of Rule 8(a) 76 did not require the plaintiffs to
provide any specific information to support their claim that the
77
consumption of McDonald's fast food products caused their obesity.

According to the court, such information should be obtained through
discovery rather than from the plaintiffs' Rule 8(a) pleadings.78
III. LIABILITY THEORIES

Plaintiffs and their lawyers are likely to rely upon a wide variety
of liability theories, including defective design, product category
Id. at *12.
Id.
71 Id. at * 13 (citing text of advertisements cited by plaintiffs that were inaccurately cited).
72 Id. at *14.
"3 Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2005).
69
70

7

Id. at 510-11.

75 Id. at 511.
76

77
78

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a).
Pelman, 396 F.3d at 512.
Id.
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liability, failure to warn, failure to provide nutritional information,
deceptive advertising, and negligent marketing. However, there are
potential problems with claims based on many of these theories,
particularly defective design, product category liability, and failure
to warn. Deceptive advertising, when based on the violation of a
statute, is more promising, as is negligent marketing, insofar as it
involves advertising directed at young children.
A. THE DEFECT REQUIREMENT

American products liability law has traditionally limited the
imposition of liability to sellers whose products are defective in some
way.79 Thus, section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts
declares that "one who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm," ° and section 1 of the Third
Restatement of Torts provides that one "who sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect.""' Courts typically distinguish
between manufacturing defects, design defects, and defective
warnings.8 2 A manufacturing defect is a one-of-a-kind condition that
arises because of a flaw in the production process.' Design defects
occur when every product in a particular production line that
conforms to the intended design has the same dangerous character-

79Michael J. Toke, Note, CategoricalLiabilityforManifestly UnreasonableDesigns: Why
the Comment d CaveatShould Be Removed from the Restatement(Third), 81 CORNELLL. REV.
1181, 1205-06 (1996) ("At the center of traditional products liability doctrine is the idea that
a product must be defective in some way before its manufacturer will be held legally
responsible for injuries resulting from its use.").
so RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 1 (1998).
E.g., Lantis v. Astec Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating three
categories are well settled); Gianitis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853,856 (D.N.H. 1988)
(stating alleged defect can be in one of three forms); Piper v. Bear Med. Sys., 883 P.2d 407,
410-11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (listing three types of defects that make product unreasonably
dangerous). These categories are now expressly recognized in the Third Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
' Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545,552-53 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that defectively
manufactured product results from "some mishap in the manufacturing process itself,
improper workmanship, or because defective materials were used in construction").
82
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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:839

istic.84 Finally, a product may be defective if the seller fails to
provide adequate warnings or instructions. 5
B. DEFECTIVE DESIGN

Although we normally associate design defects with mechanical
products, it is possible to apply a form of "design defect" analysis to
processed foods and possibly to natural food products as well. For
example, a plaintiff may argue that products such as milk, cheese,
eggs, or red meat are defective because they contain large amounts
of fat or cholesterol in their natural states. A plaintiff might also
claim that food products such as baked goods, candy, soft drinks,
hamburgers, or french fries are defectively designed because they
contain large quantities of oil, fat, salt, caffeine, or sugar, while
other foods might be considered defectively designed because they
contain additives, preservatives, or artificial ingredients. A more
persuasive argument can be made that certain products are
defectively designed because of the way they are prepared or
processed. For example, one might claim that products such as corn
chips or potato chips are defective when they are fried instead of
baked; likewise, a plaintiff might maintain that a product is
defective because a producer uses animal fat instead of vegetable oil
in the cooking process. Furthermore, a plaintiff might allege that
certain products are defective because they are addictive. Finally,
a plaintiff might argue that a product is defective because the
serving size or portion is too large for ordinary consumption.
1. The Consumer Expectation Test. Over the years, courts have
used a variety of tests in design defect cases, the two most important being the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test. 8 6
According to the consumer expectation test, a product is considered
defective if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would
8 Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d. 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) ("A design defect
occurs when the product is manufactured in conformity with the intended design but the
design itself poses unreasonable dangers to consumers.").
8 Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The
absence of adequate warnings or directions may render a product defective and unreasonably
dangerous, even if the product has no manufacturing or design defects.").
6 See Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
both tests apply to design defect cases).
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expect it to be.8" Two comments to section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts provide the foundation for this approach.
Comments g and i use a consumer expectation test to define the
terms "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" respectively. Under the heading "defective condition," the drafters state
that a seller would be subject to strict liability "only where the
product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him.""8 In their discussion of "unreasonably dangerous," the drafters declare that "[t]he article sold must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics. '
It seems clear that foods that are potentially unhealthy in their
natural states are not considered defective under the consumer
expectation test as long as the general public is aware of these
characteristics. In comment i, the drafters acknowledge that the
consumption of certain products necessarily involves some risk of
harm.s° For example, sugar can be extremely harmful to diabetics.9 '
However, as long as such products are not contaminated or adulterated with foreign substances, they will not be regarded as unreasonably dangerous.9 2 Thus, "good" whiskey is not unreasonably
dangerous although it can make people drunk and cause some
consumers to become alcoholics; "good" tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous although smoking might cause health problems; and
"good" butter is not unreasonably dangerous although it deposits
93
cholesterol in the arteries and increases the risk of heart attacks.
It should be noted that these examples include products, such as
cigarettes and butter, that pose health risks even when consumed
in moderation, as well as products, like whiskey, that are regarded
as unhealthy only when consumed in excess.

87 Tiderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 684 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Wash. 1984).
8

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).

89 Id. § 402A cmt. i.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 id.
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Foods that contain large amounts of salt, fat, oil, or sugar as a
result of preparation or processing might be defective under the
consumer expectation test if the public is not generally aware that
these ingredients are present. The plaintiffs in Pelman made such
an argument, but the court concluded that McDonald's fast food was
not defective or unreasonably dangerous since consumers knew that
such products often contained high amounts of fat, salt, and sugar.9 4
On the other hand, a food product might be considered defective
under the consumer expectation test if the producer adds artificial
ingredients to it, particularly if processing results in a product that
is more dangerous than the generic version. Thus, the plaintiffs in
Pelman argued that some of McDonald's products were defective
because they were processed in such a way as to make them
unhealthier than more commonplace versions.9 5 The court seemed
to agree, describing Chicken McNuggets as "a McFrankenstein
creation of various elements not utilized by the home cook."96 The
same was true of some of the ingredients that McDonald's added to
its french fries. The plaintiffs, however, failed to follow up on this
theory in their amended complaint.
In theory, a plaintiff can argue that a product is defective because
it is cooked or prepared in a particular way when a safer or
healthier alternative method is available. Once again, however, this
argument fails under the consumer expectation test if the consumer
is able to determine the method of cooking or preparation by casual
inspection. Although the average consumer is not particularly well
informed about basic nutrition, he or she presumably realizes that
fried foods are generally less healthy than baked foods. The same
reasoning applies to a claim that french fries or hash brown potatoes
are defectively designed because they contain more fat and calories
than plain baked potatoes. An interesting issue is whether
plaintiffs might successfully argue that foods fried in animal fats,
such as lard, are defectively designed because they contain high

Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
95 Id. at 534.
'

96

Id. at 535.

97

id.
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amounts of cholesterol and saturated fats, while foods fried in
vegetable oil have lower amounts of these substances.
Plaintiffs might also contend that a food item is defective because
it contains addictive ingredients. However, the fact that a product
ingredient is potentially addictive does not necessarily make it
defective under the consumer expectation test. Alcohol is obviously
addictive and yet beer, wine, liquor, and other alcoholic beverages
are not considered defective because the addictive character of
alcohol is a matter of common knowledge. 8 In Pelman, the
plaintiffs claimed that certain McDonald's fast-food products were
addictive.99 While the court suggested that an addiction claim might
be valid under some circumstances, it ruled that the plaintiffs' claim
was too vague to withstand a motion to dismiss.'1° As the court
pointed out, the plaintiffs failed to identify any specific ingredient
or combination of ingredients that might be addictive.'0 '
The last design defect argument involves packaging and serving
sizes. Here again, the consumer expectation test is not likely to
result in liability. Consumers can easily determine how large
packaged food portions are because the product is either sold by
weight, or the weight is clearly marked on the package labeling.
Restaurant patrons can also tell when a serving portion is larger
than normal, particularly when they can choose between a normal
serving size and a higher-priced, "super-sized" portion.
2. The Risk-Utility Test. The risk-utility test is only slightly
more promising for plaintiffs. This test originally merely enumerated various "factors" for courts or juries to take into consideration
in determining whether a product was defective. 10 2 In its more
sophisticated form, however, the risk-utility test compares the risks
and benefits of the product as designed with a safer alternative
design proposed by the plaintiff.' 3 For example, the Third Restate" Robert F. Cochran, Jr., From Cigarettesto Alcohol: The Next Step in Hedonic Product
Liability?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 705 (2000).
' Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
100 Id.
101 Id.

102 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,44 MiSS. L.J. 825,
827-38 (1973) (discussing seven factors).
103 Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) ("[Lliability may
attach if the manufacturer did not take available and reasonable steps to lessen or eliminate
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ment section 2(b) declares that a product is defective in design
"when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller.., and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe. " ' °4
The risk-utility test's requirement of a safer alternative design
would seemingly preclude design defect claims against producers of
food and other products that are unhealthy in their natural states.
In such cases there is no safer alternative design that would qualify
as an exact substitute for the product involved. For example, it is
absurd to argue that a hamburger made from ground beef is
defective because one could make something from tofu that would
contain less fat and fewer calories.'0 5 A tofuburger is simply not a
hamburger! This appears to be the Third Restatement's position.
Comment d to section 2 of the Third Restatement states that
"[clommon and widely distributed products such as alcoholic
beverages, firearms, and above-ground swimming pools may be
found to be defective only upon proof of the requisite conditions in
subsection (a), (b), or (c)." 1 6 In addition, comment d declares that
"[a] bsent proof of defect under those Sections, however, courts have
not imposed liability for categories of products that are generally
available and widely used or consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of harm."10 7
A plaintiff might do better by arguing that less salt, sugar, fat, or
oil could be used in some processed foods or that healthier or less
caloric substitutes are available. Likewise, in the case of additives
or artificial ingredients, a plaintiff might satisfy the Restatement's

the danger of even a significantly useful and desirable product."); see also David G. Owen,
Toward a ProperTest for Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing"Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1661, 1687 (1997) ("In design defect litigation, the basic issue involves . . . whether the
manufacturer'sfailure to adopt a design feature proposed by the plaintiffwas, on balance,
right or wrong." (emphasis in original)).
'04 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
105 In such a case, however, a plaintiff might propose a hamburger made from ground
round with a fat content of ten percent as a safer alternative design to one made from
ordinary ground beef with a fat content of twenty-five percent. In other words, a hamburger
made from ground round is a safer or healthier hamburger than one made from ordinary
ground beef.
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).
107 Id.

2005]

PROBLEMS FOR "BIG FOOD"?

857

safer alternative design requirement by alleging that the producer
could have used a substitute for the ingredient in question or could
have left it out altogether. For example, most canned soups and
frozen dinners contain substantial amounts of salt, and many
cereals contain large quantities of sugar. Since some brands of
soups, frozen dinners, and cereals do not contain as much salt or
sugar as standard varieties, it is obviously feasible to produce
healthier versions of these products. Under the risk-utility test,
once plaintiffs establish that additives are not necessary or that
healthier alternatives are available, sellers will have to show that
existing products are substantially cheaper or better tasting than
more expensive, but healthier, alternatives. It will then be up to the
jury to decide whether the benefits of the healthier version of the
food product outweigh its added expense or less palatable taste.
Plaintiffs might also contend that a seller's choice of mode of
cooking, such as frying, is defective if a healthier alternative, such
as baking, is feasible. Sellers, however, would no doubt respond by
arguing that fried food products are a distinct category and that
baked food products are not legitimate substitutes even if they are
healthier.' 8 Thus, baked chicken is not a substitute for fried
chicken, and baked potatoes are not substitutes for french fries.
Plaintiffs might find the Third Restatement's safer alternative
design approach more useful if their design defect claim involves the
seller's choice of cooking medium, such as lard instead of vegetable
oil. Plaintiffs could plausibly argue that fried chicken or french fries
are defectively designed when cooked in materials that contain large
amounts of cholesterol and saturated fat when healthier vegetable
oils could be used instead.
Finally, plaintiffs might claim that certain food products are
defectively designed under the risk-utility test because the products
are addictive, either in their natural states or because of the way
they are processed. If plaintiffs expect to base their design defect
claims on substance addiction, however, they will have to demonstrate that the seller could have substituted ingredients that were
nonaddictive or less addictive and chose not to do so.

"os This argument is analogous to saying that a plaintiff cannot prove that a convertible
is defectively designed by offering a sedan as a safer alternative design.
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C. PRODUCT CATEGORY LIABILITY

From a plaintiffs perspective, product category liability is a more
promising approach than the design defect theories discussed above.
Product category liability allows a court to conclude that an entire
product category, such as cigarettes or handguns, is defective if its
inherent risks outweigh its apparent benefits. 10 9
During the past two decades, plaintiffs have urged courts to
adopt the theory of product category liability on numerous occasions,
almost entirely without success." ° In those few instances where
courts have accepted product category liability, state legislatures
promptly overruled those decisions."' Academic commentators have
also been critical of this concept." 2 For example, they point out that
it is virtually impossible to calculate aggregate risks and benefits for
such products as cigarettes, firearms, and alcoholic beverages." 3
Furthermore, they have also questioned whether courts are
institutionally competent to make decisions that may have profound
social and economic effects." 4 The Third Restatement has rejected
product category liability as well. In their comments to section 2,
the Reporters declare that products such as alcoholic beverages,

109 Toke, supra note 79, at 1185.
110 E.g., Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1224 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated by 505
U.S. 1215 (1992), reaffd on remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (cigarettes); Shipman v.
Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533 (11th Cir. 1986) (handguns); Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1273 (5th Cir. 1985) (handguns); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986) (asbestos products); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d
298, 306 (N.J. 1983) (above-ground swimming pool); Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (alcoholic beverages); Baughn
v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) (trail bike).
...Richard C. Ausness, ProductCategoryLiability: A CriticalAnalysis, 24 N. KY. L. REV.
423, 432-40 (1997).
112 Id. at 450-51. But see generally Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes:
Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61

TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994) (discussing then-proposed changes to Restatement and concluding

that it is neither advisable nor necessary to require plaintiff to prove existence of alternative
feasible design to recover in strict products liability).
"' Ausness, supra note 111, at 450-51; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Closing the American ProductsLiability Frontier: The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1305 (1991).
114 Harvey M. Grossman, CategoricalLiability: Why the GatesShould Be Kept Closed, 36
S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 407-08 (1995); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 113, at 1307-08.
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firearms, and above-ground swimming pools can only be found
defective if they satisfy the requirements of section 2.115
The plaintiffs in Pelman may have had product category liability
in mind when they alleged that McDonald's manufactured and sold
"inherently dangerous" products." 6 Although the court described
this as a negligence claim, the plaintiffs seemed to suggest that fastfood products containing high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and
sugar were defective because the health risks of such products
outweighed their benefits." 7 In any event, the court agreed with
McDonald's contention that the presence of such unhealthy
ingredients in McDonald's products would not make those products
defective if consumers were aware of the risks associated with
them." 8 The result in Pelman suggests that product category
liability will not be helpful to plaintiffs in anti-obesity cases.
D. FAILURE TO WARN

Plaintiffs might argue that sellers of food products have a duty
to warn about the health risks of overconsumption. Manufacturers
normally have a duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions
to foreseeable users or consumers of their products." 9 Thus, the
Third Restatement provides that a product will be treated as
defective if "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable
instructions or warnings by the seller.., and the omission of the
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe. " 2 0
However, product sellers ordinarily have no duty to warn
consumers about risks that are obvious or commonly known.'' The

115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998).

116 Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
117 Id.
118 Id.

119 M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism,
89 W. VA. L. REv. 221,221-22 (1987); James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe
Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 523-24 (1981).
'20
121

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABiLITY § 10:1 (3d ed. 2000);

see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 428 (Tex. 1997) (declaring that health
risks of smoking were well known).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A commentj declares that
a seller is not required to warn when the product, or one of its
ingredients, is potentially harmful only "when consumed in
excessive quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger,
or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized."' 22
Comment j goes on to say that the health risks of excessive consumption are well known, as are "those of foods containing such
substances as saturated fats, which may over a period of time have
a deleterious effect upon the human heart. " 12 3 A comment to the
Third Restatement declares that "[tihe rule that no duty is owed to
warn of obvious and generally known dangers is supported by an
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions."124

This principle is illustrated by a number of cases involving
failure-to-warn claims brought against brewers and distillers. For
example, the plaintiffs in Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., who had
consumed vodka for twenty years, argued that the defendant had a
duty to warn that "consumption of its products may be hazardous 12
to5
the consumer's health and physical and economic well-being."
The trial court's dismissal of this claim was upheld on appeal.'26
Relying on comment j, the federal appeals court concluded that the
dangers of alcoholism were sufficiently well known that no warning
was necessary. 11 7 In Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., the
Tennessee Supreme Court also invoked comment j to support its
conclusion that a seller of grain alcohol did not have a duty to warn
about the danger of acute alcohol poisoning. 21 Maguire v. Pabst
Brewing Co. involved a claim by the driver of an automobile that
was struck by another vehicle driven by an intoxicated driver.'29
The plaintiff contended that the defendant's beer was unreasonably
dangerous because it did not contain any warnings about the
dangers of intoxication. 30 Once again, this claim was rejected on
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
123

id.

124 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABiLITY

F.2d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 192.
Id. at 191-92.

125 673
126
127

128 664 S.W.2d 690, 692-94 (Tenn. 1984).
129

387 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1986).
569.

130 Id. at

§ 2 reporter's note IV.D (1998).
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the basis of comment j when the court concluded that most beer
drinkers knew about the consequences of intoxication. 13' The
plaintiff in Morris v. Adolph Coors Co. was also injured by an
inebriated driver. 32 As in Maguire, the plaintiff in Morris argued
that the defendant had an obligation to warn beer drinkers about
the dangers of intoxication and drunk driving. 133 Once again, the
court concluded that comment j relieved manufacturers of alcoholic
3
beverages of the duty to warn about the risk of intoxication. 1
Finally, in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, the Texas
Supreme Court held that the risk of alcoholism from prolonged and
excessive consumption
of alcoholic beverages was a matter of
35
common knowledge.

1

This "obvious risk" exception to the duty to warn is likely to
undercut any claim based on a seller's failure to disclose the link
between obesity and the consumption of certain food products. For
example, in Pelman the plaintiffs asserted that McDonald's had a
duty to warn about the potential health risks associated with
consuming (or overconsuming) its fast-food products and failed to do
so.' 36 Quoting from Liriano v. Hobart Corp.,"' the court declared
that under New York law, manufacturers had a duty to warn about
latent dangers arising from foreseeable uses of its products about
which they knew or should have known. 13 At the same time, the
court observed that New York law did not require manufacturers to
warn consumers about "open and obvious" dangers.' 39 While
conceding that this was normally an issue for the jury to decide, the
court concluded in this case that the health risks of eating too much
fast food were open and obvious to the general population. 4 ' In
addition, because the plaintiffs had not established that McDonald's
131 Id. at

570.
735 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 583.
135 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991). But see Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d
827, 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that risk of death from acute alcohol poisoning might
not be matter of common knowledge).
" Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
137 700 N.E.2d 303, 303 (N.Y. 1998).
138 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
139 Id. at 541.
140 Id.
132
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products significantly contributed to their obesity and health
problems, the court also ruled that they had failed to show any
causal connection between the defendant's failure to warn and their
injuries.'" Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' failure
to warn claim.'4 2
A potentially stronger failure to warn claim involves the risk of
addiction. While most consumers know that eating fast food may
contribute to weight gain and obesity, few consumers are aware of
the possibility that certain food items might contain addictive
ingredients. The plaintiffs in Pelman alleged that McDonald's
products contained ingredients that could be addictive, but did not
clearly indicate whether they sought to impose liability upon
McDonald's for selling "inherently dangerous" products, or whether
their liability claim was based on McDonald's failure to warn that
However, the court pointed out
their products were addictive.'
that the presence of addictive ingredients in McDonald's products,
in contrast to the risk of obesity, was not so "open and obvious" that
consumers would know about it.'" Thus, the court suggested that
the defendant might have a duty to warn about addiction if McDonald's products actually contained addictive ingredients.'4 5
In Pelman, however, the court rejected the plaintiffs' failure-towarn claim because it failed to meet even minimal cause-in-fact
requirements.' 4 6 In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs would have had to allege that they were in fact addicted
to McDonald's products and have described the characteristics of
this addiction.'4 7 Furthermore, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs must also have shown how they and others became
Finally, the plaintiffs would have had to establish a
addicted.'
causal link between their addiction to fast food and their alleged
health problems. 4 9

144

Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id.

145

Id,

146

Id,

141
142
143

147

Id.

148 Id.
149

Id. at 542-43.
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The experience in Pelman suggests that an addiction-based
failure-to-warn claim may be more successful than one that is based
on a seller's failure to warn about the general health risks of obesity
or poor nutrition. However, even when a plaintiff alleges that the
purveyor of fast food or highly processed food failed to warn about
the addictive nature of its product, that plaintiff cannot merely
speculate about the possibility of addiction. Rather, he or she must
be able to make an addiction claim with great specificity and back
it up with credible scientific evidence.
E. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE NUTRITIONAL INFORMATION

Plaintiffs may also claim that sellers have a duty to disclose
nutritional information about their products. This claim is distinct
from failure to warn since it is not based on a duty to inform
consumers about a specific product-related risk, but rather involves
a duty to disclose more general information. In the case of packaged
foods, the duty to disclose nutritional information is statutory in
nature. The Federal Nutritional Labeling and Education Act 5 '
requires sellers of packaged foods to place nutritional information
on their product labels. 5 ' At the same time, however, the Act
declares that its labeling requirements do not apply to food served
in restaurants or other establishments
where food is served for
52
immediate consumption.

In Pelman, the plaintiffs contended that McDonald's failure to
post nutritional information on its products and at points of
purchase violated the New York Consumer Protection Act. 53 The
court looked to Oswego Laborers'Local 214 PensionFund v. Marine
Midland Bank'54 for guidance. In that case, the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that the defendant bank had violated the
Consumer Protection Act when it failed to inform depositors that

21 U.S.C. § 343 (2000).
15' Id. § 343(q).
152 Id. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i).
153 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 520; see also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349-350 (McKinney
150

2004) (making unlawful "idleceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business" and
prohibiting "[fl alse advertising in the conduct of any business").
154 647 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995).
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for-profit entities would not receive interest on accounts that
exceeded $100,000.'
The court in Oswego stated that the statute
did not ordinarily require businesses to determine consumers'
individual needs or to provide information in response to those
needs; however, it determined that a duty to provide such information may arise "where the business alone possesses material
information that is relevant to the consumer."'5 6 The Pelman court,
however, concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the
requirements of Oswego because they had not alleged that McDonald's alone possessed information about the nutritional content of its
products or that consumers could not reasonably obtain this
information.'5 7 In fact, elsewhere in the opinion, the court observed
58
that nutritional information was available on McDonald's website.1
A claim based on failure to disclose nutritional information would
probably be successful if such disclosure were required by a state
statute or by the Federal Nutritional Labeling and Education Act.
Courts normally treat noncompliance with statutory or administrative regulatory requirements as negligence per se. 1 A failure to
disclose claim, however, would be more problematic in the absence
of such a statutory mandate. Products liability law requires a seller
to warn about a product's inherent risks and to provide instructions
for safe use, but it does not seem to impose a separate duty to
disclose any other information about the product. Therefore, in the
absence of a statutory duty to disclose, plaintiffs will have to argue
that failure to disclose nutritional information, at least in the case
of products that are high in fat, salt, sugar, alcohol, or other harmful
ingredients, is either tantamount to failing to warn consumers about
the health risks of such products or that it is part of a larger scheme
to misrepresent the nature of these risks.

155 Id. at 743-44.
10 Id. at 745.
157 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 529.

8 Id. at 530.
Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong"RegulatoryComplianceDefense, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1210, 1239 (1996).
"'
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F. DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING

A deceptive advertising claim may be based on a statute, or it
may be based on common-law principles of fraud or misrepresentation."' A product seller whose statements or advertisements violate
a deceptive advertising statute is potentially liable under the
doctrine of negligence per se. Even in the absence of a statute,
however, plaintiffs may seek damages on the basis of common-law
fraud or misrepresentation. In Pelman, the plaintiffs based their
deceptive advertising claim on an alleged violation of the New York
Consumer Protection Act.' 6 ' The plaintiffs charged McDonald's with
both deceptive acts and omissions.'6 2 The plaintiffs pointed to an
advertising campaign that used the phrases "McChicken Everyday"
and "Big N' Tasty Everyday."'6 3 The court concluded, however, that
the invitation to eat at McDonald's "everyday" made no specific
health claim and, therefore, was "mere puffery."" The plaintiffs
also alleged that an assurance on the defendant's web site that
"McDonald's can be part of any balanced diet and lifestyle" was
deceptive. 6 5 According to the plaintiffs, this statement implied that
moderate consumption of McDonald's products was consistent with

160 See generally DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., supra note 121, § 3:2-3:5 (discussing bases for
claims).
161 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 349-350 (McKinney 2004). Section 349 prohibits "[dleceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any
service in this state," while section 350 bans "[alse advertising in the conduct of any
business." To recover under this statute, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the act, practice,
or advertisement was directed at consumers; (2) the act, practice, or advertisement was
misleading in some material respect; and (3) the act, practice, or advertisement caused injury
to the plaintiff. However, unlike a common-law fraud claim, a claim under the New York
statute does not require the plaintiff to establish either reliance or scienter. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 198, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (upholding
jury verdict under N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349), rev'd in parton othergrounds by 344 F.3d 211

(2d Cir. 2003); rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v.

Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26883 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2004). Furthermore,
a deceptive practices claim under the Consumer Protection Act may be based on omissions
as well as affirmative acts. Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland
Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995) (including representations and omissions equally as
deceptive acts under § 349).
162 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
163

id.

16 Id.
'6

at 528.

Id. at 527.
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a healthy diet and lifestyle. However, the court concluded that the
statement was not deceptive. In order to satisfy the statutory
standard for deception, McDonald's would have had to claim that
eating their products every day was consistent with good
nutrition.16 The Pelman court would need to read the advertisements and the web site statement together in pari materia to find
that McDonald's had made such a claim, but the court was not
willing to do so.167

The court did cite several advertisements made by McDonald's in
the 1980s, but currently barred by the statute of limitations, as
examples of the sort of statements that might qualify as deceptive.
For example, the court described one advertisement in which
McDonald's asserted that "[olur sodium is down across the menu"
when the amount of sodium remained unchanged in its regular
french fries, regular cheeseburgers, Chicken McNuggets, and vanilla
milkshakes.' 68 In another advertisement mentioned by the court,
McDonald's claimed that its milkshakes contained "[wiholesome
milk, natural sweeteners, a fluid ounce of flavoring, and stabilizers
for consistency. And that's all."" 9 In fact, McDonald's milkshakes
contained other ingredients such as artificial flavor and two
chemical preservatives, sodium benzoate and sodium
hexametaphosphate. 7 ° Finally, the court described a third advertisement, which extolled the relatively low cholesterol content of
McDonald's hamburgers, but failed to mention that the hamburgers
an ingredient that also contributes to the
contained saturated fat,
7
risk of heart disease.1 '

G. NEGLIGENT MARKETING

The concept of negligent marketing assumes that product sellers
should not engage in marketing strategies that increase the risk
that their products will be purchased by persons who are more likely

166
167
168

16
170
171

Id. at 528.
Id. at 527-28.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id.
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than ordinary consumers to injure themselves or others." 2 One
form of negligent marketing involved the targeting of unsuitable
consumers. Antismoking advocates, for example, contend that a
considerable amount of cigarette advertising is deliberately
calculated to encourage teenagers to smoke. 7 3 Handgun manufacturers have been accused of directing their advertising at unsuitable
persons. In Merrill v. Navegar, for example, the plaintiffs claimed
that a manufacturer of semi-automatic firearms advertised its
products in magazines such as Soldier of Fortune, SWAT, Combat
Handguns,Guns, Firepower,andHeavy Metal Weapons, which were
widely read by militarists and survivalists, and called attention to
certain features that made its products particularly suitable for
criminal use.'7 4
The plaintiffs in Pelman seem to have made a similar claim of
negligent marketing when they alleged that some of McDonald's
advertising was targeted at young children.' 75 The first advertisement featured a plastic beef steak figure named "Slugger" who was
accompanied by a pamphlet on nutrition that assured children that
eating two servings a day from the meat group would help them to
"climb high and ride [their] bikes farther." 7 ' The court indicated
that this statement, had it been set forth in the complaint, might
have been specific enough to survive a motion to dismiss, but that
the plaintiffs, in order to recover, would also have to show that the
statement was deceptive and that they had been injured as a
consequence. 77 In other words, targeting children was not, on its
own, a basis for liability.
The second promotion involved the "Mightier Kids Meal," a
The plaintiffs mainsuper-sized version of the "Happy Meal."'

172 Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liabilityfor the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An Analysis
and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REv. 907, 912-17 (2002)
(discussing various categories of negligent marketing).
173 See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocatingthe Costs of Smoking: The Application ofAbsolute
Liabilityto CigaretteManufacturers,52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 420 (1991) (claiming considerable
amount of cigarette company advertising is directed at teenage and preteenage market).
174 89 Cal. Rptr. 146, 156-57 (Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
171 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
176 Id.
177 id.
178 Id.
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tained that this appellation led children to think that they would
become "mightier" or more grown-up if they consumed larger
portions of McDonald's products. 7 9 The court, however, rejected
any such claim by McDonald's was
this argument, concluding that
80
"puffery."
than
more
nothing
Despite the Pelman court's negative reaction, the prospect of a
negligent marketing claim based on targeting children looks
promising primarily because the targeting claims that were made
in recent tobacco litigation provide a template for plaintiffs in
unhealthy food cases. It appears that some fast-food companies
have used many of the same marketing techniques as the tobacco
companies employed prior to the 1998 Master Settlement AgreeIn both cases, the groups targeted were children and
ment.'
teenagers who were likely to exercise poor judgment. 82 To be sure,
the charge against the tobacco companies was more serious because
they were accused of encouraging conduct that was prohibited by
law. l8 3 Nevertheless, encouraging children to engage in risky
conduct by means of sophisticated marketing techniques, if proven,
is not likely to meet with judicial approval.
IV.

LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY

Even if the courts recognize one or more of the liability theories
discussed above, plaintiffs must overcome a formidable array of
legal doctrines that affect liability. These include causation, duty
and proximate cause, misuse, shifting responsibility, and federal

Id.
Id.
" For a discussion of the Master Settlement Agreement, see Michael DeBow, The State
Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State Governments: Repairing the
Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 568-70 (2001) (describing financial and other provisions
of Master Settlement Agreement).
182 See John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food
Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 112 (2003) (noting that teenagers are "notoriously
capricious in their reasoning skills" and "much more likely to be motivated by mere emotion
or peer pressure than are adults").
'83 Most states have laws that prohibit the purchase or smoking of cigarettes by those
below a certain age. Gregory R. Veal, Note, The Model DrugParaphanaliaAct: Can We
Outlaw Headshops--andShould We?, 16 GA. L. REV. 137, 165 (1981). Cigarette advertisements that target underage consumers are encouraging them to commit a criminal act.
179

180
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preemption, as well as conduct-based defenses such as contributory
negligence, comparative fault, and assumption of risk.
A. CAUSATION

1. The Legal Test for Causation. The "sine qua non" or "but for"
test is the prevailing test for determining cause in fact. 8 4 Under
this approach, the plaintiff must prove that he or she would not
have been injured if the act in question had not occurred.8 5 Some
states use the "substantial factor" test instead of the traditional "but
for" test. 8 ' Under the substantial factor approach, the defendant's
act is treated as a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury, even though
the injury would have occurred anyway, if the jury determines that
the act was a substantial factor in causing the injury. 7 This test
is properly used in cases where two actions occur and either one is
sufficient alone to cause the injury.'8 8 Some states, however, employ
the substantial factor test as an alternative to the "but for" test,

184

DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., supra note 121, § 12.2.

"s See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Davis, 233 S.E.2d 825,827 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (allowing
car driver's descendant to recover from manufacturer of defective alternator that caused stall
resulting in decedent's accident); Cruz-Mendez v. ISU/Ins. Serv., 722 A.2d 515, 524-26 (N.J.
1999) (allowing worker to bring suit against fireworks display insurer after worker burned
hand when digging hole to light fuse). But see Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470,471
(Tex. 1991) (rejecting sequence of events as too attenuated).
18 See Frank J. Vandall, O.K CorralI1:Policy Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun
Manufacturers, 44 VILL. L. REV. 547, 558 (1999) (discussing causation issues in cigarette and
handgun product liability litigation).
187 See, e.g., Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Wis. 1980) (finding
defendant's negligence "need not be the sole factor or the primary factor, only a 'substantial
factor' " in producing plaintiffs injury).
" See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. St. M. R.R. Co., 179 N.W. 45,46,49 (Minn.
1920) (upholding verdict for plaintiffwhere fire sparked by defendant's locomotive consumed
plaintiffs house simultaneously with fire of unknown origin), overruled by Borsheim v. Great
N.R. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (1921).
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even though only one causal factor is involved,' 8 9 while other states
allow either test to be used. 9 °
Proof of causation can be particularly difficult when multiple
potential causes are involved. When each actor is independently
liable, the issue is treated as one of apportionment of damages.
However, a more difficult causation problem arises when some, but
not all, of the actors may have caused the plaintiffs injury. Under
the traditional rules, the plaintiff must prove that a specific
defendant caused his or her injury. Thus, a plaintiff who is injured
by a generic product that is made by several manufacturers must
identify the actual maker in order to recover. 19' Some courts,
however, have adopted causation rules that relax the plaintiffs
traditional proof requirements with regard to causation. One
example of this trend is "enterprise liability," a doctrine that
permits a plaintiff to sue an industry trade association, as well as
its individual members.' 9 2 The rationale for enterprise liability is
that the trade association owes a duty to promulgate adequate
safety standards when individual companies within the association
delegate this power to it. The concept of market share liability also
enables plaintiffs to overcome proof problems. When a plaintiff is
injured by a generic product and the actual manufacturer cannot be
identified, the theory of market share liability allows the plaintiff to
.9 See, e.g., Morales v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 151F.3d 500,507(6th Cir. 1998) (upholding
product liability verdict where jury could have found defendant's product substantially
contributed to plaintiff's motorcycle accident); Parks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 113 F.3d 1327,
1332-33 (3d Cir. 1997) (remanding for new trial to include jury instruction that plaintiff could
recover, though contributorily negligent, if defendant's product was substantial factor in
causing harm); Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1223 (Cal. 1997) (reinstating
jury verdict where defendant asbestos manufacturer's product could be found to be
substantial factor in plaintiff's illness).
" Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 817-18 (Iowa 1996) (allowing "but for" test in place
of substantial factor test in groundwater contamination case); Daye v. Gen. Motors Corp., 720
So. 2d 654, 659-60 (La. 1998) (describing "but for" test as first prong of causation analysis;
refusing to reach substantial factor prong).
191 See David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1625 (1981) (discussing problem of proving liability in DES cases where
drug was generic).
'9' See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(holding industry trade association liable for failing to promulgate adequate standards for
blasting cap warning labels); Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
EnterpriseLiability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 974 (1978) (suggesting that enterprise liability
theory be used in DES cases).
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recover a pro rata amount from each of the companies that manufactures the product based on its share of the overall market.19 3
Regardless of which test is used, plaintiffs will often be required
to rely on expert testimony to satisfy the causation requirement.
Such expert testimony, however, must meet the applicable evidentiary admissibility standards. The prevailing standard for admissibility was developed by the United States Supreme Court in the
1990s, beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc."94
'
According to Daubert, the trial judge should exercise a
"gatekeeper" function by assessing the reliability of proffered expert
testimony, taking into account such factors as the testability of the
expert's theory or technique; peer review and publication of the
expert's theory or technique; the rate of error of the technique; and
the general acceptance of the theory or technique within the
relevant scientific community.'9 5 Daubert's rigorous admissibility
requirements may be difficult for some plaintiffs to meet.
2. Proofof Causationin Food or Drink Cases. Each type of claim
in a food or drink case involves its own particular causation issues.
One type of claim alleges that some substance used in the production or processing of the product causes cancer or some other
disease. For example, some claimants have charged that french
fries at certain fast-food restaurants contain acrylamide, a chemical
byproduct that allegedly causes cancer.'9 6 To recover in such a case,
a plaintiff would have to prove that he or she has been diagnosed
with cancer, that he or she consumed french fries at the defendant's
restaurant, that the french fries in question contained acrylamide,
that acrylamide is a carcinogen, that the amount of acrylamide
consumed and the manner of consumption was sufficient to cause
the plaintiffs cancer, and that the plaintiffs cancer was not due to
other causes.

193

See Andrew R. Klein,Beyond DES: Rejecting the ApplicationofMarket ShareLiability

in Blood ProductsLitigation,68 TUL. L. REV. 883, 886 (1994) (describing use of market share
liability theory in DES litigation).
'9
509 U.S. 579,589-94 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
138 (1999) (extending Daubert analysis to all expert testimony); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997) (reiterating "gatekeeper" role of trial judge in admitting expert
testimony).
195
.6

509 U.S. at 593-94.

Cohan, supra note 182, at 110.
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Another claim is that the product, or one of its ingredients, is
addictive. It has been suggested that consuming foods that are high
in fat or sugar can stimulate the brain's natural opioids and produce
effects similar to, though less intense than, those produced by
heroin or cocaine.' 9 7 Any plaintiff, however, who makes such a claim
will have to provide expert testimony backed by scientific evidence
that satisfies the Daubert standard. Likewise, a plaintiff who
alleges that the defendant's product caused a specific health
problem will have to show a causal connection between consumption
of the product and that health condition. Moreover, in ajurisdiction
that follows the "but for" test, the plaintiff will have to prove that
the health condition would not have occurred otherwise. This
presents particular difficulties for a plaintiff whose health problems
are due to obesity, since other factors such as lifestyle or heredity
may cause obesity regardless of the plaintiffs eating habits.'9 8
In such cases, even the more relaxed substantial factor test might
pose difficulties for plaintiffs, as Pelman illustrates. In Pelman, the
court declared that the plaintiffs would have to show that the
consumption of McDonald's products was a "substantial cause" of
their health problems.' 9 9 To determine whether the consumption of
McDonald's products was a substantial cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries, the court would have to consider a number of factors,
including"the aggregate number of actors involved which contribute
towards the harm and the effect which each has in producing it" as
well as "whether the situation was acted upon by other forces for
which the defendant [was] not responsible." 0 0 The Pelman court
concluded that "no reasonable person could find probable cause
based on the facts in the Complaint without resorting to 'wild
speculation.' 201
Claims based on misrepresentation, targeting, or failure to warn
may also raise causation issues. In most states, a plaintiff who
197
198

Rogers, supra note 6, at 877.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, The Surgeon General's Call to Action to

Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity 1 (2001) ("Overweight and obesity are caused
by many factors.") (cited in Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 539 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)).
19 Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38.
200

Id. at 538.

201

Id. (citing Price v. Hampson, 530 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (App. Div. 1988)).
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alleges misrepresentation must establish reliance. 0 2 Thus, one who
claims that a producer who made false claims about the nutritional
value of its product must also prove that he or she would not have
purchased or consumed the product if the false claim had not been
made. The same would be true of a negligent marketing claim
based on targeting. A plaintiff who alleges that the defendant
directed its marketing at a vulnerable group must show that he or
she would not have otherwise bought or consumed the product.
Generally, causation is less of a problem for plaintiffs in failure-towarn cases. In theory, one who brings a failure-to-warn claim must
also prove that he or she would have heeded the warning and, thus,
avoided injury if an adequate warning had been given. However,
many courts provide that the plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that he or she would have heeded such a warning.20 3
B. DUTY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE

Food sellers are likely to contend that they owe no duty to
prevent plaintiffs from overeating. There is some precedent for such
a "no duty" argument. For example, defendants in "social host"
cases have often successfully maintained that they have no duty to
determine whether adult guests are sober enough to drive.0 4 In a
number of cases, courts have employed similar reasoning to relieve
handgun manufacturers from liability for injuries to third parties.0 5

E.g., Hitachi Credit Am. Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d 614, 628 (4th Cir. 1999); Sippy
v. Costich, 609 P.2d 204, 208 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Dobbin v. Pac. Coast Coal Co., 170 P.2d
642, 648 (Wash. 1946).
203 E.g., Pavlik v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exps. Intl, 135 F.3d 876, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1998)
(applying rebuttable presumption to label on butane container in self-administered inhalation
death); Coffinan v. Keene Corp., 608 A.2d 416, 420-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(suggesting plaintiff entitled to rebuttable presumption that label would be heeded in
asbestosis case), affd, 628 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993).
2' E.g., Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 159 (Ill. 1995) (rejecting host liability for
inebriated minor guest); Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 970 (R.I. 1995) (rejecting host
liability to third parties). But see Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984)
(enforcing liability for injuries to third party after host permitted clearly inebriated guest to
drive).
206 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1997) (refusing to hold
manufacturer of hollow-point bullets liable for injuries due to criminal use of nondefective
product); Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900,912-13 (D.N.J. 1997) (preventing recovery
from manufacturer of hollow-point bullets used in homicide); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger &
202
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Similarly, sellers of food and drink might claim that as long as their
products are unadulterated and properly labeled, they owe no
additional duty to adult consumers and cannot be held responsible
for the poor lifestyle choices some consumers make. This sort of
duty analysis is attractive to courts when they believe that policy
concerns militate against holding the defendant liable. Because
duty is not a jury issue, the court can hold in the defendant's favor
on duty grounds and keep the case away from a jury.
Defendants might also make a proximate cause argument by
suggesting that a customer's decision to overeat is a superseding
cause sufficient to relieve them of liability for any resulting obesity.
Ordinarily, proximate cause rests on foreseeability: An unforeseeable intervening cause breaks the chain of causation, but a foreseeable intervening cause does not. However, sometimes a court will
conclude that a deliberate act by a mentally competent adult is a
superseding cause even though it is not particularly unforeseeable.
In the past, for example, courts have sometimes treated suicide as
a superseding cause, not because it was unforeseeable, but because
the courts regarded it as more significant than the defendant's
original act of negligence. °6 That being said, it is hard to argue that
eating a Big Mac is as morally significant as committing suicide.
Therefore, this type of analogy is not likely to be very persuasive.
C. MISUSE

Food producers may also argue that the doctrine of misuse should
bar consumers from recovering damages for their obesity. Product
misuse may appear in various guises. For example, if the court
regards the misuse as unforeseeable, it will probably characterize

Co., 566 N.W.2d 53,56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs' claims against manufacturer
of handgun used in homicide and imposing attorney's fees on plaintiffs for vexatious
litigation).
206 E.g., Brown v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 88 N.E. 80, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1909) (finding
defendant employer not liable where employee violently took own life ten months after
debilitating manufacturing accident); Daniels v. N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424,
426 (Mass. 1903) (holding railroad not liable for death effected by accident victim's deliberate
suicide three weeks after he was struck by train); Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217,22122 (Tenn. 1965) (rejecting liability of allegedly abusive boyfriend for suicide of plaintiffs
mother).
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the misuse as a superseding cause and completely relieve the
product manufacturer of liability. Another approach is to treat
misuse as a form of comparative fault, which will reduce damages
but not bar them altogether." 7 Finally, misuse may affect the
question of whether a product is defective or not. Most courts hold
that a manufacturer has a duty to design its product in a way that
eliminates, or at least reduces, the risk of harm from foreseeable
misuse, but relieves the manufacturer from liability if the misuse is
unforeseeable."' Foreseeability affects the duty to warn as well:
Courts usually hold that a manufacturer has no duty to warn about
the risks of unforeseeable misuse;0 9 however, if the misuse is
foreseeable, the manufacturer will be held liable for failing to warn
about the risks of such misuse.2 10
Food producers may try to argue that obese plaintiffs have
"misused" their products by overeating. This argument has a
certain amount of intuitive appeal, but there are a number of
problems with it. First, there is no objective standard for determining whether a particular pattern of consumption constitutes misuse.
For example, most people would agree that consuming fast-food
meals three times a day, seven days a week for any length of time
constitutes misuse,2 1' but what about one fast-food meal a day or
five fast-food meals a week? Does "super-sizing" a fast-food meal
constitute misuse? Furthermore, what constitutes misuse in a
particular case might depend on the age, weight, lifestyle, and

'7 E.g., Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 870 (Ariz. 1995) (remanding for
failure to include jury instruction on comparative fault in product liability action for injury
from power tool); Mauch v. Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 348 (N.D. 1984)
(relieving rope manufacturer of liability where customer was injured after negligently tying
rope to tow tractor).
208 See, e.g., Newman v. Util. Trailer & Equip. Co., 564 P.2d 674, 676 (Or.
1977)
(remanding products liability action in semi-trailer accident for failure to instruct jury on
strict liability).
209 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. p (1998).
210 E.g., Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 19-21 (Md. 1975) (reinstating jury verdict for

plaintiff where cologne bottle had no warning that contents were flammable); Brune v. Brown
Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (finding jury issue of liability where
manufacturer did not warn of dangers of alcohol poisoning on tequila label).
211 Laura Parker, Legal Experts PredictNew Rounds in Food Fight,USA TODAY, May 7,
2004, at 3A. In his movie, Super Size Me, director Morgan Spurlock ate McDonald's cuisine
for thirty days. During that time, he gained almost twenty-five pounds, and his liver
accumulated fat so quickly that his doctor referred to it as pith. Id.
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overall health and physical condition of the consumer. Thus, a
physically fit thirty-year-old may be safely able to consume more
high-fat, high-calorie food than a fifty-year-old, sedentary individual
with high blood pressure or heart disease.
Another problem with the misuse argument is that the alleged
misuse is not unforeseeable. In fact, there is considerable evidence
that food producers employ advertising and marketing strategies
that encourage the consumption (or overconsumption) of potentially
unhealthy products such as fast food and high-sugar cereals.21 2
Thus, the misuse argument would lose much of its force if plaintiffs
could prove that food producers encourage poor nutrition.
D. SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY

Even if restaurants and manufacturers of packaged food products
are held liable for obesity-related injuries, suppliers of raw materials or ingredients can try to avoid liability by making a "shifting
responsibility" argument. 2 1' These suppliers can maintain that they
are not responsible for the finished products that are produced by
others, nor do they have a duty to warn consumers about the health
risks associated with the consumption of such products. Clearly,
those who place finished products into the stream of commerce may
be held liable for any defects in their products and may also have a
duty to warn users or consumers about any inherent risks associated with their products. The new Restatement of Torts, however,
acknowledges that suppliers of raw materials and component parts
should not be held liable for injuries caused by defective finished

212 Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660,676 (Cal. 1983)
(declaring that defendant cereal companies were "engaged in a nationwide, long-term
advertising campaign designed to persuade children to influence their parents to buy sugared
cereals"); Karl A. Boedecker et al.,Excessive Consumption: Marketingand Legal Perspectives,
36 AM. Bus. L.J. 301,303 (1999) (stating that McDonalds targeted Arch Deluxe sandwich, an
item with high fat content, at older consumers, many of whom had high blood cholesterol
levels); Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency andConsumerChoice Theory in Nutritional
Labeling, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (arguing that large portion of fast-food advertising is
directed at children).
212 For a discussion of shifting responsibility in the context of the duty to warn, see
generally Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediariesand SophisticatedUsers: Encouraging
the Use of Intermediariesto Transmit ProductSafety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185
(1996).
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products when the materials they supply are not themselves
defective.2 1 4 According to the Restatement, suppliers of raw
materials or component parts are liable for defects in the finished
product only if the material or part is defective or if the supplier
substantially participates in the integration of the material or
component into the design of the finished product and this integration causes the finished product to be defective, and the resulting
defect causes the plaintiffs harm.2 1 5
Producers of raw materials, such as sugar, corn syrup, salt, and
vegetable oil, will no doubt argue that their products are not
unhealthy in their natural state but only when consumed in excess
and that they have no control over the producers of finished
products. Even those who supply ingredients that may be potentially unhealthy in their natural state may rely on this rationale.
Thus, pepperoni suppliers may try to shift the blame to pizza
sellers, while purveyors of ground beef can point the finger at fastfood restaurants.
E. FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Preemption is concerned with the power of Congress to prohibit
the states from regulating in certain areas or to assert primacy
when there is a conflict between state and federal regulatory
schemes." 6 The power to preempt ensures that federal law will
prevail over conflicting state statutes,2 17 local ordinances,218 and
state common-law doctrines.2 19 Over the years, courts and commen-

214 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. a (1998).

Id. § 5.
216 Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes:
215

Supreme Court Preemption JurisprudenceSince Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 917 (2003-04)
(discussing preemption doctrine).
217 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 99-100 (1992) (declaring
that OSHA preempts state occupational and safety standards unless they receive federal
approval).
218 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973)
(holding municipal airport curfew preempted by FAA regulations).
219 See, e.g., Intl Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (holding that Clean
Water Act bars private nuisance actions against out-of-state polluters); Chi. & N.W. Transp.
Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 309, 331 (1981) (ruling Interstate Commerce Act
preempts state tort claim based on abandonment of service).
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tators have divided preemption into two basic categories, express
and implied, and further subdivided implied preemption into field
preemption and conflict preemption."' Express preemption occurs
when a federal statute specifically excludes state regulation in a
particular area.22 ' Congress may also impliedly preempt state law
when a federal regulatory scheme effectively occupies the field and
leaves no room for state regulation or when state law conflicts in
some way with federal law.222
Business enterprises that are subject to federal regulatory
standards have often raised federal preemption as a defense in tort
cases. 223 In two recent cases, fast-food sellers argued that the
Federal Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) 224 preempted state tort claims. The NLEA requires sellers of packaged
food to provide certain nutritional information, such as applicable
serving size, calories, fat, and cholesterol, on their product

220 M. Stuart Madden, FederalPreemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations, 21
PACE L. REV. 103, 106-10 (2000).
"' See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992) (National
Association of Attorneys General airline fare advertising guidelines); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983) (ERISA benefits); Ry. Employes' [sic] Dep't v. Hanson, 351
U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (union security agreements).
Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm:Conceptual and Interpretive
Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1150-51 (1998) (describing categories of preemption analysis
traditionally employed by Supreme Court).
2
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-64 (2002) (holding state common-law
product liability claim not preempted by conflicting federal regulation in boating accident);
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352-53 (2001) (rejecting private
plaintiffs state law tort claim purporting to address manufacturer's fraud on FDA in
presenting faulty medical device for approval); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
861-62 (2000) (finding D.C. tort law preempted by federal regulations setting production
regulations for cars with driver's-side airbags); Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344,
•347-48 (2000) (ruling state negligence claim preempted by federal railway crossing
regulations); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 490-91 (1996) (finding pacemaker
manufacturer's defense of preemption only partially valid in tort litigation); Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995) (rejecting truck manufacturer's claim that absence
of federal regulations concerning antilock brakes preempted state product liability action);
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 676 (1993) (affirming preemption claim of
railroad regarding federally regulated speed of train, but rejecting preemption with regard
to locally regulated railroad crossing warning signals); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 517-20 (1992) (permitting limited state tort litigation against cigarette manufacturer in breach-of-warranty claim, but rejecting plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim as preempted
by federal cigarette labeling legislation).
224 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2000).
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labeling,2 2 but exempts restaurants from this requirement.2 26 In
addition, the NLEA contains an express preemption provision,
which declares that no state may require nutrition labeling that is
not identical to that mandated by the Act.2 27
In Pelman, McDonald's argued that the NLEA preempted the
plaintiffs' claim that failure to provide nutritional information in its
restaurants violated New York's Consumer Protection Act.228 In
response, the court pointed out that the NLEA expressly permitted
states to impose nutritional labeling requirements for food that was
not covered by federal law. 229 Furthermore, the FDA had acknowledged that states were free to enforce their own consumer protection
laws against restaurants whose menus contained false or misleading information. 23" Accordingly, the Pelman court rejected McDonald's preemption argument.2 3 '
However, the preemption argument was more successful in
Cohen v. McDonald'sCorp., a case decided by an Illinois intermediate appellate court in 2004.232 The plaintiff in Cohen based his claim
on McDonald's alleged violation of the state's Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act2 3 3 as well as on common-law
fraud.23 4 The case centered around the defendant's failure to
id.
Id. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i).
227 Id. § 343-1(a)(4).
228 Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 526 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(4) (2000)).
2
230 Id. (citing FDA, Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58
Fed. Reg. 2478, 2517 (1993)).
231 id.
232 808 N.E.2d 1 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
23' Id. at 4 (discussing 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 1999)). According to the
plaintiff,
McDonald's violated the Act by: (1) misrepresenting that its food products
have a nutritional value that they do not have, (2) misrepresenting that
its food products are of a particular standard quality or grade, (3)
misrepresenting the nutrient content values for foods targeted for
consumption by children ages one to three, and (4) failing to adhere to the
225
226

National Labeling and Education Acti's] ... nutritional requirements.

Id.
234

Id. at 3-9. The plaintiff alleged that:
(1) McDonald's represents that its food products have a nutritional value
that they do not have; (2) McDonald's represents that its food products
were of a particular standard, quality or grade where they were of
another; (3) McDonald's includes toys intended for children ages one to
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provide specific nutritional information about its "Happy Meals"
menu item.2" 5 A "Happy Meal," which was intended for young
children, consisted of a food entr6e, a small order of french fries, a
2 36
small drink, and a toy.
Since 1995, McDonald's has provided nutritional information to
its customers in the form of a document entitled "McDonald's
Nutrition Facts."23 v This document identifies the serving size and
number of calories in each of its menu items, along with information
about minerals, vitamins, and total fat.2 31 McDonald's Nutrition
Facts, however, did not list the "Happy Meal" as one of its menu
items, nor did the document provide nutritional information about
the "Happy Meal's" ingredients.2 3 9 The reason for this was that the
FDA had not established nutritional standards for fat, cholesterol,
sodium, and other ingredients for children under the age of four.2 4 °
Nevertheless, the plaintiffcontended that the McDonald's Nutrition
Facts document violated the NLEA's labeling requirements by not
providing separate nutritional information for "Happy Meals."2 41
This, in turn, violated the state consumer protection statute and
also constituted common-law fraud.2 4 2 In response, McDonald's
argued that the plaintiffs claims were preempted by the NLEA and
FDA labeling regulations promulgated under the authority of that
Act.2 43 The trial court agreed and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss. 2"

three in its Happy Meals thereby offering a food product intended for
children under 4 years of age without adequate revision of the nutritional
information; and (4) McDonald's misrepresents nutrient content value for
foods targeted for consumption by children, ages one to three.
Id. at 4.
2M

Id.

Id. at 3.
7 Id. "McDonald's Nutrition Facts" were displayed on posters and signs in McDonald's
restaurants. Id. McDonald's also made copies of this document available to customers and
displayed it on the Internet. Id. Finally, copies of "McDonald's Nutrition Facts" could be
obtained by writing or telephoning a request to the Company's headquarters. Id. at 3-4.
m Id. at 4.
29 Id.
m 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(j)(5)(ii)(E) (2004).
Cohen, 808 N.E.2d at 4.
Id.

2'
242

m Id. at 4-5.
2"

Id. at 5.
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On appeal, the intermediate appellate court observed that since
the NLEA did not provide for lawsuits by private citizens against
those who violated its labeling requirements, such plaintiffs had to
rely upon such remedies as were available under state law.24 5
Relying on Morelli v. Weider Nutrition Group, Inc.,246 the court
determined that the NLEA did not expressly preempt all state law
claims based on misleading nutrition information.2 4 7 The court also
concluded, however, that facts in the instant case were distinguishable from those of Morelli.248 In Morelli, the defendant allegedly
inaccurately stated the nutritional contents of its sports nutrition
product,24 9 but in Cohen the defendants were charged with a failure
to provide information.2"'
Since the FDA had not established the daily values of nutrients
for foods intended for consumption by children under the age of four,
and it had not promulgated nutritional labeling requirements for
such foods, the effect of a successful lawsuit by the plaintiff would
be to force McDonald's to develop its own nutritional labeling
system for "Happy Meals" and similar products.2 5 ' According to the
court, this would result in a nonuniform system of product labeling
that would be inconsistent with the NLEA's policy of uniform
nutritional labeling requirements. 2 2 For this reason, the court held
that the plaintiffs claims were preempted.25 3
The court's reasoning in Cohen suggests that food producers may
invoke federal preemption as a defense to some failure-to-warn
claims, claims based on failure to provide nutritional information,
and claims based on deceptive advertising. On the other hand,
federal preemption does not seem to be as relevant to design defect
or negligent marketing claims.

245
24

247
248

Id. at 8.
712 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 2000).
Cohen, 808 N.E.2d at 8-9.
Id. at 9.

249 Morelli, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
250 Cohen, 808 N.E.2d at 9.
251
252
253

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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F. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, COMPARATIVE FAULT, AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK

Finally, food producers might argue that obese plaintiffs are
subject to such traditional affirmative defenses as contributory
negligence, comparative fault, and assumption of risk. Under the
doctrine of contributory negligence, an injured party is completely
barred from recovering damages if he or she is also at fault, and this
negligence is a proximate cause of the injury.2 5 4 Thus, contributory
negligence would be an ideal defense if a jury found a plaintiff's
eating habits to be unreasonable. However, only a few states still
recognize contributory negligence;2 55 most have replaced it with
some form of comparative fault." 6 Unlike contributory negligence,
comparative fault only reduces the plaintiffs damage award in
proportion to his or her fault.2 57
To prevail under either contributory negligence or comparative
fault, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff failed to exercise
reasonable care. In the case of obesity, a food producer would have
to establish that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by consuming
foods he or she knew were potentially unhealthy or by knowingly
consuming excess quantities of foods that were otherwise nutritious.
Alternatively, if the plaintiff claimed to be unaware of the health
risks of overconsumption and obesity, the defendant could try to
prove that a reasonable person would have learned more about
these risks and changed his or her eating habits accordingly.
The hostile public reaction to the Pelman plaintiffs suggests that
juries might be receptive to a fault-based defense such as comparative fault. 258 As the tobacco litigation demonstrates, however, public
opinion can shift dramatically if evidence of wrongdoing by the
defendants starts to emerge.

254

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451 (5th

ed. 1984).
'z These states are Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.
OWEN ETAL., supra note 121, § 15:1 at 95 n.21.
Comparative fault is recognized in forty-six jurisdictions. Id. § 15:1 at 95.
257 KEETON ET AL., supra note 254, § 67, at 471-72.
' Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Another conduct-based defense is assumption of risk. Under the
traditional doctrine, one who knowingly and voluntarily encountered
a risk created by the defendant was barred from recovery." 9
Assumption of risk rests on the notion that one who consents to
incur a risk implicitly agrees to take responsibility for any injuries
that may result therefrom. 260 Assumption of risk has always been
controversial, however, and many states have now abolished the
doctrine outright 261 or have merged it with comparative fault.2 62 It

might be possible for a food producer to assert assumption of risk as
a defense in some cases; however, the producer would have to show
that the plaintiff was aware of the specific risk. While many
consumers have a general idea of the connection between overeating
and obesity, relatively few would have the specific knowledge about
nutrition and health that a court would probably require in order to
find that the plaintiff assumed the risk.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Obesity is undoubtedly a serious public health problem in
America. The National Institutes of Health estimates that ninetyseven million persons in the United States are overweight or
obese. 26

Obesity-related health problems, such as diabetes,

coronary heart disease, and hypertension, cause 300,000 deaths
each year264 and cost at least $117 billion in 2000.265 Some legal
commentators believe that successful tort actions against producers
259

KEETON ET AL., supra note 254, at 486-87.

OWENETAL., supra note 121, § 14:3 at 27.
261 E.g., Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586,592 (Ky. 1967) (abolishing assumption of risk
M

in Kentucky); Bolduc v. Crain, 181 A.2d 641,644 (N.H. 1962) (continuing to deny assumption
of risk as defense); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90,95-96 (N.J. 1959)
(finding assumption of risk too similar to contributory negligence).
262 E.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 292-93 (Fla. 1977) (merging assumption of
risk with contributory negligence, applying comparative negligence principles); Perez v.
McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tenn. 1994) (finding implied assumption of risk to be
analyzed under comparative negligence principles).
263 NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION,
EVALUATION,
AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS: THE EVIDENCE REPORT, NIH
Publication No. 98-4083 at vii, available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/obgdlns.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
2r U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 198, Foreword.
265 Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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of "unhealthy" food will induce them to produce healthier versions
of their products or, at the very least, encourage them to provide
more accessible nutritional information to consumers.26 6 However,
the use of tort litigation by private parties to achieve social objectives is problematic. First, there is a question of whether courts are
more qualified than other branches of government to make determinations about public health issues. Second, there is a legitimate
concern about the effect of tort litigation on the price of food and its
possible adverse effect on the economic health of the food industry.
No one wishes to see manufacturers of food products follow in the
footsteps of asbestos manufacturers. Finally, if these lawsuits are
successful, they will reduce the choices available to consumers.
A. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE

Modern tort theory assumes that manufacturers will not invest
sufficiently in product quality or safety as long as product-related
accident costs are externalized to the public.2 67 On the other hand,
if accident victims can recover for their injuries, manufacturers will
have an incentive to make their products safer and thereby reduce
their liability.268 Another benefit of cost internalization is that it
encourages efficient levels of consumption. When these costs are
internalized, consumers can make efficient decisions about consumption, even though they have no specific information about a
product's social costs because the price they must pay for the
If accident costs are
product fully reflects these costs. 26 9
externalized to third parties, however, the price charged to consumers will be too low, and they will consume too much of the product.
26 E.g., Cohan, supra note 182, at 130-31 (concluding litigation will force companies to

provide health warnings); Rogers, supra note 6, at 883 (finding healthier items as indirect
benefit of litigation).
2. See Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of ProductsLiability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077,
1087 (1965) (noting consumers must pay for quality control themselves).
268 James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of CorporateRationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983).
269 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., EncouragingSafety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1289-90 (1980).
27 Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for
the Treatment of Disease,Injury and DisabilityCaused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 81, 104 (1994).
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Tort law also serves a corrective justice function by forcing product
manufacturers to compensate victims who have been injured by the
sale or marketing of defective products or other wrongdoing. 1
Finally, tort actions can serve vindicatory and educational functions
by providing a forum for injured consumers to tell their stories.2 7 2
However, there are problems with using tort law to implement
public health policy. The traditional way to develop public policy is
through legislation. The legislative process is certainly not perfect,
but it does provide a forum for all points of view to be heard. In
addition, legislators can commission studies and obtain neutral
expert opinions on complex issues. Finally, legislative directives are
relatively specific and operate prospectively, thereby giving
regulated parties a clear idea of what they must do to avoid
economic penalties. Rulemaking by administrative agencies has
many of these same advantages. The agency will usually have
experts on its staff and can obtain additional information if
necessary. In addition, the hearing process provides an opportunity
to obtain information and opinion from a wide range of interested
parties.2 3 Like legislation, administrative rules and regulations are
usually specific in nature and operate prospectively. Finally,
educational initiatives may be even more effective than coercive
measures.27 4 For example, some of the educational programs that
are currently directed at underage smoking could be adapted to
promote better health and nutrition.
Courts, on the other hand, are not very well equipped to deal
with public health issues. First of all, both judges and lay juries
often have difficulty understanding technical or scientific data. 5

2. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 177-79

(1973) (discussing causation of harm in defective, dangerous product situations).
22 Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1177, 1218 (1990).
273 See Dix A. Noel, ProductsDefective Because of InadequateDirectionsor Warnings, 23
Sw. L.J. 256, 258 (1969) (discussing ability of administrative agency to better understand
problems after "extensive and impartial research").
274 Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising
in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1181-84 (2003).
" See, e.g., Scott G. Lindvall, Note, Aircraft Crashworthiness: Should Courts Set the
Standards?,27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 401-02 (1986) (discussing inadequacy of courts to
adjudicate aircraft design issues); Peter J. Mooney, Note, Judicial Participationin the
Establishmentof Vehicle Safety Standards: A System in Need of Reform, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 902,
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In addition, access to information is limited because litigants have
no incentive to provide courts with information unless it supports
their position.276 Furthermore, the case-specific nature of the
litigation process induces judges and juries to focus on narrow
issues and directs their attention away from broader social or safety
concerns. 7 Finally, different courts do not necessarily reach the
same conclusions when they decide similar cases. This lack of
uniformity and consistency, when it occurs, produces uncertainty
and confusion.
B. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

Holding food producers liable for the health risks of excessive
consumption could have serious adverse economic consequences for
the industry. First, the cost of litigation itself can be very substantial. In addition, due to the large number of plaintiffs who are likely
to sue, the potential liability involved is enough to bankrupt the
entire industry. Finally, third parties, such as shareholders,
creditors, suppliers, and employees, will be seriously harmed if the
food industry is subjected to massive liability.
If the courts opened the door to liability of food producers, one
would expect to see large-scale litigation similar to that currently
being brought against the tobacco companies. Whether injured
plaintiffs bring class actions or individual lawsuits, defendants and
their insurers can expect to incur substantial legal expenses as they
investigate, defend, and settle these claims.278 Litigation costs are

919-20 (1981) (discussing courts' involvement in motor vehicle design issues despite concern
of lack of expertise).
276

See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers'Conscious Design

Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1532-33 (1973) (explaining
incapacity of courts due to case-by-case determinations, requirements of waiting for case, and
inadequate investigation).
277 See, e.g., W. KIPVISCuSI, REFORMINGPRODUCTSLIABILITY8-9 (1991) (noting courts are
not capable of setting safety limits when confined to particular case); Note, A Question of

Competence: The JudicialRole in the RegulationofPharmaceuticals,103 HARV. L. REV. 773,
780 (1990) (discussing inability ofcourts to determine complex issues because of narrow focus
of trial).
278 See Steven Shavell, Liabilityfor Harm Versus Regulation ofSafety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 363-64 (1984) (discussing costs of litigation).

2005]

PROBLEMS FOR "BIG FOOD"?

887

likely to be especially high in food cases because of the complex
causation and damages issues that would be involved.
In addition to litigation costs, food producers will sustain huge
losses if a large number of plaintiffs win substantial damage
awards. The estimated pecuniary cost of obesity, such as lost wages
and health care costs, presently exceeds $117 billion.27 9 If one adds
to that figure damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages,
the resulting liability would be truly staggering. Not only will such
large-scale tort liability seriously harm, and possibly bankrupt,
many food producers, it will also injure a large number of third
parties. Obviously shareholders, creditors, and employees will
suffer if a company retrenches or ceases operations altogether.
Those who transport, distribute, and process food products will also
be adversely affected, as well as farmers and others who grow or
produce food products or their constituent ingredients. 280 Finally,
sellers of food and drink will have to pass the cost of increased tort
liability on to their customers in the form of higher prices.28 '
C. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

Finally, the notion that food producers should be held liable for
making people fat reflects a view of human nature that is contrary
to deeply held attitudes about autonomy and personal responsibility.
The principle of personal autonomy demands that individuals be
free to control their own lives.28 2 At the same time, under this
principle of personal autonomy individuals should take responsibility for their actions and not try to shift the blame to others when
their bad judgment causes injury.28 3
Classical economic theory, with its emphasis on efficiency
through allocation, also recognizes the value of personal autonomy
by assuming that people should be able to exercise their preferences
Cohan, supra note 182, at 106.
The food service industry employs some 11.7 million people. See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act: Hearing on H.R. 339 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial &
Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (2003)
(statement of Christianne Ricchi, National Restaurant Ass'n).
28' See id. at 6 (statement of Representative Keller).
282 JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 23 (1996).
282 See id. at 86 (noting close relationship between freedom and responsibility).
279
280
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for goods and services in a free market. Under the "rational person"
or "expected utility" model ofdecisionmaking, rational persons "seek
to maximize [their] subjective expected utility."2" 4 Thus, individuals
who consume the "wrong" type of food arguably do so because they
believe that the expected utility of such conduct outweighs the
expected adverse health risks. Therefore, in the absence of fraud,
consumers should be allowed to eat the foods they like, notwithstanding the disapproval of nutritionists and public health officials.
Once consumers have exercised their free will, however, they should
not be allowed to shift the blame to sellers of food products when
they develop obesity-related health problems.
Some commentators, however, question whether people act
rationally when they purchase products in the marketplace.2 8 They
point out that the human brain cannot process all of the information
it receives and, therefore, relies upon cognitive shortcuts or
heuristics to cope with this information overload.2" 6 Unfortunately,
this reliance on heuristics often leads to systematic errors in
decisionmaking." 7 One such cognitive shortcut is the representative
heuristic, in which individuals rely on a small portion of data, which
they consider to be representative of the whole, instead of analyzing
all of the available data.2 88 Another heuristic is known as framing.
Framing influences the way people deal with new information once
a preliminary risk assessment has been made.2 89

24

Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under InformationalAsymmetry: The Effect

of Framingon Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 394 (1990).
' See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) (discussing problems with
rational person rule); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (presenting evidence
in support of problems with rational person models).
' See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and DecisionMaking in
Legal Scholarship: A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1503-06 (1998) (discussing
heuristics and other factors affecting rational decisionmaking).
27 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains,Losses, and the Psychology ofLitigation,70 S.CAL. L. REV.
113, 118 (1996) (noting "decisionmaking illusions 'may' fool our judgment").
288 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognitionand the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211, 222 (1995).
289 See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 747, 753-54 (1990) (describing framing as "baseline"
measurement).
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Product sellers often take advantage of cognitive limitations and
biases in order to influence consumers. 290 For example, McDonald's
exploits what is known as the "affect heuristic by advertising a
family-friendly environment and generating positive associations
that may cause consumers to devalue their perceptions of the risks
arising from unhealthy diets."2 9 ' In the same manner, alcoholic
beverage advertisements typically provide memorable depictions of
the good times that accompany the consumption of their products,
perhaps leading consumers to underestimate the risks of alcohol.292
Manufacturers also make use of the framing effect in their warnings
and product descriptions in order to downplay the negative aspects
of their products.2 93
Despite this evidence of market manipulation by product sellers,
the argument for personal autonomy and personal responsibility is
still viable. First of all, there is very little empirical evidence that
advertising actually succeeds in manipulating consumers to any
great extent.29 4 Furthermore, in a free society, all people (except
those who are insane or mentally incompetent) must be allowed to
make decisions for themselves, even though their intelligence,
education, and experience may vary widely. Anti-obesity litigation
is an attempt by the public health community to impose its lifestyle
preferences on consumers by forcing sellers to remove certain
products from the marketplace. This strategy, though well-intended, is inconsistent with deeply held notions of autonomy and
personal responsibility.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Obesity is a serious threat to public health, and more can be done
to combat it. For example, the federal government could mandate
better nutrition information on food packaging, and it could also
29o James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-RelatedRisk and Cognitive

Biases: The Shortcomings of EnterpriseLiability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 223

(2000).
291
292
29

Note, supranote 274, at 1168.
Hanson & Kysar, supra note 285, at 731.
See Howard Latin, 'Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41

UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1241 (1994) (noting underestimation of risk based on framing effect).
294 Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 290, at 230-33.
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require fast food restaurants to provide on-site information about
the nutritional content of their products. In addition, school boards
could restrict the amount of "junk food" that is served to schoolchildren in school lunch programs and in vending machines. Furthermore, government entities, schools, and employers could do more to
encourage exercise. Finally, both public and private health
organizations could implement programs to educate consumers
about diet, nutrition, and the health risks of obesity. What is not
needed, however, is more tort litigation like Pelman. These lawsuits
do little to combat obesity and are economically and morally
destructive. Not only should the courts discourage anti-obesity
lawsuits, but Congress and state legislatures should consider
enacting laws to ban them.
A. JUDICIAL ACTION

Courts should do what they can to discourage anti-obesity
lawsuits against food producers and restaurant owners. First,
courts should insist that plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of
existing tort doctrines. For example, courts should require plaintiffs
to offer scientifically credible proof of causation. Courts should also
require plaintiffs who rely on design defect theories to prove the
existence of a safer alternative design. In addition, courts should
enforce the "obvious risk" rule in failure-to-warn cases and rule as
a matter of law that consumption of high-calorie foods causes
obesity. Moreover, courts should require those who bring deceptive
advertising claims to prove that they actually saw and relied on the
defendant's representations. Furthermore, courts should refuse to
allow recoveries based on novel liability theories such as product
category liability, failure to disclose nutritional information, and
negligent marketing. Finally, in appropriate cases, courts should
find that obesity claims are preempted by federal labeling requirements. If courts react in this manner, plaintiffs' lawyers will
eventually give up the fight and seek out easier targets.
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B. LEGISLATION

Another option to combat obesity is state or federal legislation
banning certain types of lawsuits against the food producers and
sellers. The National Restaurant Association developed a model
state act that would limit the liability of manufacturers, distributors, sellers, or retailers of food and nonalcoholic beverages for
weight gain, obesity, or weight-related health problems.29 5 The
National Restaurant Association, working closely with state
restaurant associations, managed to introduce its proposed legislation in a large number of state legislatures2 9 6 during 2003 and
2004.297 So far, the Model Act, or something like it, has been
enacted in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and
Washington.2 98
Although state legislation is useful, most food producers and fastfood restaurant chains operate in an interstate environment.
Consequently, they look to relief from liability at the federal level.
In fact, several bills to preempt damage claims based on obesity are
currently pending in Congress. The proposed "Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act," House Bill 339, was introduced in the
House of Representatives by Congressman Keller on January 27,
2003.299 The House voted in favor of the bill, 276 to 139, on March
10, 2004.0 The proposed act declares that the manufacturer,
distributor, or seller of a food or nonalcoholic beverage product shall
not be subject to civil liability in either state or federal court for any
consumption-based claim unless the plaintiff proves that the
product was not in compliance with applicable statutory and
regulatory requirements.3 0 '

Nat'l Restaurant Assoc., Model Bill, at http://www.restaurant.org/government/state/
nutritionlresources/nra_200501_modelbilltext.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
296 See http://www.restaurant.org/government/state/nutrition/bi~s-lawsuits.cfm (listing
states).
27 Natl Restaurant Assoc., FrivolousLawsuits/PersonalResponsibility, at http://www.
restaurant.org/government/state/nutrition/billskey.cfn#lawsuits (lastvisited Jan. 31,2005).
Id.
2"

H.R. 339, 108th Cong., 1st Seas. (2003).

No Id.
3' Id. §

2(a).
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A somewhat more elaborate bill known as the "Commonsense
Consumption Act of 2003," was introduced in the Senate by Senator
McConnell on3 July
17, 2003.02 This bill, if enacted, would prohibit
"any person" 1 3 from bringing a "qualified civil liability action" in
any state or federal court.30 4 The bill defines a "qualified civil
liability action" as a civil action "for damages or injunctive relief
based on a claim of injury resulting from a person's weight gain,
obesity, or5 any health condition that is related to weight gain or
obesity."

30

The prohibition applies to lawsuits against manufacturers and
sellers of a "qualified product" and their trade associations. 30 6 A
"qualified product" is defined as a food as defined in section 201(f)
of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.3 0 7

This provision

defines "food" as "(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other
animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of
any such article." 0 ' The Senate bill's prohibition against lawsuits
does not extend to acts by a manufacturer or seller that knowingly
and willfully violate state or federal laws applicable to the "manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertisement, labeling, or sale
of the product" if the violation is a proximate cause of the weight
gain, obesity, or health condition.3 9 The proposed law also permits
actions for breach of contract or express warranty in connection with
the purchase of a qualified product,310 as well as actions against the
seller of an adulterated product.31 '
Plaintiffs' lawyers, public health advocates, and others will
undoubtedly oppose the legislative proposals discussed above.

3o S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
30 The term "person" means "any individual, corporation, company, association, firm,

partnership, society, joint stock company, or any other entity, including any governmental
entity." Id. § 3(3).
304 Id. § 2(a). The bill would also dismiss any qualified civil liability action that was
pending on the date of its enactment. Id. § 2(b).
305

Id. § 3(5).

306

Id.

307

Id. § 3(4).

21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2000).
mo S. 1428, 108th Cong. § (3)(5)(A).
310 Id. § (3)(5)(B).
311 Id. § (3)(5)(C).

308
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Nevertheless, it may be necessary to preempt anti-obesity lawsuits
through legislation if the courts allow such litigation to proliferate.
VII. CONCLUSION

Obesity is a significant health problem in America. The food
industry should provide consumers with healthier food choices, and
it should also make more nutritional information available to
consumers. Government action may also be warranted if the food
industry does not act on its own. At the same time, consumers
should be free to consume what they want, even if public health
officials disapprove of their culinary preferences.
Anti-obesity litigation is not a good response to the obesity
problem. If successful, anti-obesity litigation will interfere with
legislative and administrative regulations in this area, cause
economic disruption, and undermine personal autonomy. Courts
and, if necessary, Congress and state legislatures, should nip this
sort of litigation in the bud.

